Cracking the Code: How OCGs are Infiltrating Europe’s ports
The infiltration of ports by Organised Crime Groups is a major threat for the legitimate economy and security of the EU, says a new joint analysis report produced by Europol, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, and the Security Steering Committee of the ports of Antwerp, Hamburg/Bremerhaven, and Rotterdam.
An estimated 3.5 billion tonnes of legal trade is processed annually through the main EU ports, according to 2021 data. Containerised goods accounted for 25% of goods handled, the equivalent of 98 million containers. It’s the sheer enormity of these port operations that attracts crime groups, partly because they know that port authorities are only able to inspect between 2% and 10% of the containers in their operational environments.
Europol says the ultimate objectives of the ‘Criminal Networks in EU Ports – Risks & Challenges for Law Enforcement’ report is to raise awareness among private and public authorities, to encourage EU-wide information exchange, and to provide recommendations to develop a European approach, particularly to tackle the modus operandi used by criminal networks to misappropriate container reference codes. This is believed to have helped facilitate the trafficking of hundreds of tonnes of drugs and also increases the risk to legitimate cargoes if organised criminals are able to extract containers using the same methodology.
Vulnerabilities of EU ports
The scale of port operations presents an enormous logistical hurdle for law enforcement agencies as well as a clear opportunity for criminal networks needing to access logistical hubs to facilitate their illegal activities. Such criminal networks have, consequently, infiltrated ports in all continents, the report states.
Europe’s three biggest ports are among the most-targeted by criminal infiltration through the corruption of shipping companies’ personnel, port workers, importers, transport companies, and representatives of national authorities among other actors, whose actions are necessary to secure the entry of illegal shipments. However, this approach requires a high number of corrupt accomplices. In order to focus their efforts and minimise the risks of losing merchandise, the report’s authors say, organised criminals are seeking new modus operandi that require the corruption of far fewer individuals.
Europol says the specific technique to misappropriate container reference codes – or so-called PIN code fraud – which the importer, their representative, or transporter can use to pick up a container from the destination terminal – requires the corruption of just one individual, along with either the corruption or a Trojan horse style infiltration of extraction teams, who are then paid between 7% and 15% of the value of the illegal shipment. The logistical processes carried out in ports entail participation from various actors that can be targeted for corruption, all providing targets for corruption. Bribery fees may reach hundreds of thousands of euros. The highest fees are paid to essential links in the extraction chain, often crane operators, planners or employees providing access to information via IT systems.
The report highlights how criminal networks arrange the infiltration of ports and coordinate local networks of corrupted port insiders to organise the passage of containers containing illicit goods into the EU. For this, they rely on worldwide networks of cells with trusted members or use dedicated service providers. They work in a targeted way, by analysing insider data to select container shipments that are less likely to be inspected and that are organised by logistics companies where they have access to corrupted actors.
‘With many public and private actors having access to port infrastructure and port information, opportunities for infiltration and facilitation of illicit shipments are manifold,’ Europol states.
The report says the M.O. of misappropriation of container reference codes ‘reflects how criminal networks continuously look for loopholes in port procedures and gaps in security’.
It states: ‘One of the most effective measures to close loopholes/gaps in the logistics process is the principle of access to data and data systems on a need-to-know basis.Logistics companies limiting access to container reference codes has already proven to be an effective solution against this M.O.’
It adds: ‘Because of the complex process of tracking the arrival of containers and their movement within ports, and the need for insider support, each entry point of illicit goods can be considered a hotspot for corruption. For most MO, the major challenge is determining the stack position, which is the location of the container on the terminal between the thousands of other containers. Containers can be stacked in blocks with containers placed in the interior of the block or very high up, making them difficult or impossible to access. To locate and ensure accessibility, collaboration of multiple corrupted dock workers, container drivers and crane operators is almost always necessary.
‘However, the increasing digitalisation of port infrastructures offers other opportunities for extractors and is reflected by the rising number of incidents involving breached and manipulated IT systems. Criminal networks mostly receive the codes from corrupt individuals who unlawfully use the accounts of legitimate companies involved in transport and port logistics. In some cases, however, they may also deploy hacking or phishing.’
Building a corruption network
Criminal network members, Europol says, insert themselves into the community of personnel active in port-related activities. They may do this by gaining access to the social network directly, through sport or leisure activities, or take up employment in the port to make contact with port workers on the job or in training sessions. Once the contact has been established, they grow the network of insiders and strengthen the infiltration using corruption and intimidation. Violent acts range from threats, intimidation and torture, to murder. Occasionally, innocent individuals operating in ports or outside ports are targeted, such as the drivers that legitimately move containers in which drugs may be concealed.
With higher levels of automation in ports and increasing digitalisation of cargo handling procedures, adequate mitigation measures need to be put in place both by private and public partners, Europol says.
Main recommendations
In sharing its finding, the report’s authors call for:
- International information exchange on the criminal networks’ activities in ports with Europol and amongst EU Member States should be further enhanced.
- Continuous attention must be paid to the integration of security features in the design of port infrastructure.
- Implementing public-partnerships to involve all port actors essential for tackling the infiltration of criminal networks in EU ports.
“Criminal networks work closely to evade security at land borders and at air and maritime ports. They have one thing in mind – profit. An effective response is closer collaboration between the public and private sector; this will make both sides stronger. This report, the first ever created in cooperation with the ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg/Bremerhaven, is part of building this common front. This information exchange has led to deeper knowledge, which is the most effective weapon against organised crime,” said Europol’s Executive Director, Catherine De Bolle.
